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A SKETCH 




OF 

OUR SECOND BOMBARDMENT 

OF 


FORT FISHER. 


A PAPER 

READ BEFORE THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMANDERY 


OF THE 


MILITARY ORDER 


OF THE 


LOYAL LEGION OF THE UNITED STATES, 


NOV. 2, I887. 


BY COMPANION 

DANIEL AM MEN, 

Rear Admiral U. S. Navy. 



WASHINGTON, D. C.: 

JUDD & DETWE1LER, PRINTERS. 
1887. 










(Our Second bombardment of .fart .fisher. 


I propose a brief sketch of the second bombardment of Fort 
Fisher and the taking of it by assault, and some remarks as to the 
value of spherical-shell guns in attacking earthworks. Comrades 
will remember that we had bombarded Fort Fisher three weeks 
previously; the second time we came to stay, no matter what the 
enemy might do to discourage us. Had the assault failed, the 
troops would have continued to occupy the sand spit north of the 
fort, and torpedo and other launches would have been taken into 
the river. By the aid of calcium lights, steamers could then no 
longer have passed up the river to Wilmington. Fort Fisher, 
thereafter, would have served the enemy no better purpose than 
if situated miles away at sea. I have reason to believe that such 
were the intentions of Gen. Grant had the assault failed. 

On the morning of the 13th January, ’65, one hundred vessels 
(in round numbers) were at anchor twelve miles east of Fort 
Fisher. About three-fourths were vessels of war of all grades ; 
the remainder were army transports carrying 12,000 men, under 
the command of Gen. Terry. About sunrise they all got under 
way—the ironclads to attack the fort, and the wooden vessels of 
war, and the transports, to land the troops, with as much despatch 
as possible, some five miles north of the fort, on an open sand 
beach. 

The Ironsides led four vessels of the monitor class: the Monad- 
nock, with two turrets and four guns; the Canonicus, Mahopac, 
and Saugus, with two guns each, making ten 15-inch spherical- 
shell guns. The Ironsides cairied in broadside seven 11-inch guns 
and an 8-inch rifle in broadside, a formidable battery against a 


— 4 — 


sand xoft, making, with the monitors, eighteen available guns. 
As soon as they were within 1800 yards, the fort opened fire on 
them, which was quite disregarded until they anchored as near the 
beach as their draught would permit. The Ironsides was then 
about 1000 and the nearest monitor 700 yards from the fort. Then 
a shell or so was thrown from each vessel with a carefully studied 
elevation, and they then opened fire, which was actually maintained 
by some of them, without cessation, for three days and two nights. 

In the meantime, the wooden vessels of war and the army trans¬ 
ports had anchored near the beach, and the process of debarcation 
went on rapidly. A few shells had been previously thrown into 
the brushwood, to arouse any lurking enemy. A-t once a large herd 
of cattle, frightened at the bursting shells in the wood, rushed 
wildly to the beach. They had been provided for the garrison of 
the fort, but surrendered unconditionally, and were doubtless found 
useful auxiliaries. 

At 2 p. m. half of the army force had landed. The second line 
of vessels, led by Alden in the Brooklyn, and followed by twelve 
gunboats, left soon after and anchored in position outside of the 
ironclads and a little to the northward, so as to destroy the guns 
on the land face—the intended line of approach of the land force 
in making an assault. The arrival of our line was the cause of 
increased activity in the batteries of the enemy : they had sobered 
down a good deal under the discipline of the ironclads since the 
morning. The heavy vessels of war left the landing of the troops 
and got into position only a little before sunset, having been delayed 
an hour by the fouling of the screw of the Minnesota, the leading 
vessel, commanded by Lanman. The third division and the 
reserve line, composed of the weaker vessels, remained to com¬ 
plete the landing of the troops and all of the stores, which was 
effected by noon of the next day. 

I recall no sight during the war more superbly grand than the 
bombardment of that evening. As the sun went down and the 



shadows fell upon the waters, the waning light made the uu.sting 
shells flash out in the obscurity, as did the guns of the enemy—so 
far as th .*y were served against such odds. Far above, on the 
fleecy clouds, rested the rosy hues from the departed sun; and 
underneath, in heavy masses, not high above the fort, laid the 
smoke clouds of battle. It was superlatively grand. But soon the 
shadows darkened into obscurity, and the wooden ships were with¬ 
drawn from action. All that livelong night did the ironclads send 
their shells, slowly and effectively, and, as found necessary, they 
were supplied with ammunition from tugs, during that and the fol¬ 
lowing night. 

In the forenoon of the next day, the wooden vessels of all classes 
came in on the lines assigned them, the frigates about a mile from 
the fort, and double-enders forming another line, stretching away 
towards the entrance of the river where the Mound and Buchanan 
batteries were located. The fleet, as before, directed their fire at 
the particular guns assigned them ; the commanders of the vessels 
were satisfied and gratified at the effect of the shells on parapets, 
traverses, and the guns of the enemy. 15-inch shells with bursting 
charges of 13 lbs., n-inch with bursting charges of 6 lbs., did 
their work superbly, and even 9-inch shells with bursting charges 
of only 3 lbs. were not to be despised, and besides, there were a 
great many of them. Where the shells fell a crater would appear, 
and the ability to fight the guns was in a large degree destroyed 
by the masses of sand continually thrown around them. As the 
result, some of the guns of the enemy were feebly served, and the 
greater number were silent. When the fort no longer replied to 
the guns of the fleet, signal would be made to fire slowly; one gun 
at a time from every "vessel would then be directed as at target 
practice, against the particular object. The enemy at times would 
be induced by this slow firing to open fire again, but only to re¬ 
ceive such a storm of shells in return, as to squelch him. One of 
my Confederate friends who was in the fort, recently told me that 



the effect of the fire was so damaging and overwhelming that they 
literally could do nothing; great logs of wood, fifty feet in length, 
on the parapet, would be thrown from their bed and tossed in the 
air by a shell that had buried itself in the parapet. When night¬ 
fall of the second day came, and the wooden vessels were again 
withdrawn, certainly the fort had a sorry appearance, and many of 
the guns had been rendered useless. 

In an interview that night, Admiral Porter and Gen. Terry 
agreed upon an assault at noon on the next day. A naval con¬ 
tingent of i,600 blue jackets and 400 marines was to assault the 
sea face; the movement was to be made from the northward i 
along the beach to the northeast bastion. 

The third day, until the time of the assault, which was about 
3 o’clock, the fleet maintained a slow but constant fire on the 
fort without being favored with a reply. During the night the 
army had made an extended line of pits close up under the 
stockade of the fort on the land side, and occupied them. When 
the assault came, the movement was begun from them; the troops 
were managed in the most courageous and dexterous manner, 
and carried the seven most westerly traverses with little loss: | 
then followed the most stubborn fighting from traverse to traverse, 
the huge shells of the ironclads clearing the spaces between the 
traverses as the troops advanced, and thus the battle raged when 
daylight no longer served for firing shells; our troops had then j 
carried the bastion and a traverse, or more, on the sea face. It 
was not until ten o’clock that the enemy laid down his arms. 

The blue jackets and marines under Breese moved as soon as 
the army began the assault; a certain number, as a skirmish line, i] 
had dug trenches and pits at some distance from the northeast j 
bastion, and occupied them in the forenoon. The body of the I 
naval force landed later, and advanced over a considerable stretch I 
of open beach, and of necessity, in masses; the loss was heavy, I 
and although a part of the force actually reached the stockade 





— 7 — 

► *t the bastion, its greatest use, unhappily, was to divert a very 
considerable number of the enemy from the land face upon which 
the army attack was made. The fort was gallantly taken, although 
the naval assaulting column did not reach the parapet. 

All that night, in the distance, the sky was lurid with the 
flames of the burning works, abandoned by the enemy. Although 
the battle was over, the hand of the destroyer yet lingered. At 
sunrise, on the 15th, the main magazine of the fort exploded, 
burying 200 or more persons, friends and foes alike, beneath the 
falling masses. The supposed cause is asserted, that some drunken 
men entered the magazine with a light, expecting to find liquor. 
The army loss in killed and wounded is given at 700, and the 
navy loss at 383, including 20 missing, supposed to have been 
blown up by the explosion. 

Fort Fisher was regarded as one of the strongest earthworks 
ever constructed as against ships. It mounted some 40 guns, 
almost without exception of heavy caliber: 15 of them were 
permanently disabled, generally on the land face. In the first 
bombardment a number of our Parrott guns burst, causing a 
serious loss of life. In the second bombardment, the Admiral 
issued an order forbidding the use of rifles. Against earthworks, 
when employed within 2,000 yards, spherical shells serve a more 
effective purpose, in my belief, than the same weight of projectiles 
from rifles; the latter have too much penetration and the burst¬ 
ing charges are too small to form craters. 

There were thrown by the fleet into Fort Fisher 22,000 spher¬ 
ical shells, containing heavy bursting charges and weighing no 
less than 2,200,000 pounds. 

As we all know, a brick or stone fort can soon be destroyed 
by rifled guns of inconsiderable power at a distance of 4,000 
yards or more. Nevertheless, the superiority of spherical shell- 
guns against earth or stone works, when within a mile, is estab¬ 
lished in the belief of most naval men, and they would say the 


— 8 — 


more guns are brought against the earthwork the better. We 
have reason to believe such batteries as we fought, are quite within 
the control of the numbers of guns that can readily be brought 
against them by even an insignificant naval power. Perhaps for 
this reason naval officers of high rank in our service, without 
exception, so far as I know, regard favorably for land defence, 
revolving turrets of large dimensions, known popularly as the 
“ Timby system.” Had our forts such appendages there would 
be no enfilading them, nor would it be possible to cover the 
guns with sand when shelled, as is the case with sand batteries. 
To ensure the turrets working satisfactorily, it seems to me that , 
they should be water borne, which would be the least expensive 
foundation possible for such great weights. These ideas are given 
for the reason that the Loyal Legion cannot be indifferent as to i 
the best coast defence, and if our naval operations during our 
civil war have afforded any lessons, as at Fort Fisher, we should 
carefully weigh their import. 


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